The latest spyware in Google Play

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In July of 2019, Dr Web reported about a backdoor trojan in Google Play, which appeared to be sophisticated and unlike common malware often uploaded for stealing victims’ money or displaying ads. So, we conducted an inquiry of our own, discovering a long-term campaign, which we dubbed “PhantomLance”, its earliest registered domain dating back to December 2015. We found dozens of related samples that had been appearing in the wild since 2016 and had been deployed in various application marketplaces including Google Play. One of the latest samples was published on the official Android market on November 6, 2019. We informed Google of the malware, and it was removed from the market shortly after.

Kaspersky researchers says: ” During our investigation, we discovered various overlaps with reported OceanLotus APT campaigns. Thus, we found multiple code similarities with the previous Android campaign, as well as macOS backdoors, infrastructure overlaps with Windows backdoors and a few cross-platform resemblances.

Besides the attribution details, this document describes the actors’ spreading strategy, their techniques for bypassing app market filters, malware version diversity and the latest sample deployed in 2020, which uses Firebase to decrypt the malicious payload.”

Malware versions
For the purposes of the research, we divided samples we found into a series of “versions” based on technical complexity: from the basic Version 1 to the highly sophisticated Version 3. Note that they do not fully correlate with the chronological order of their appearance ITW: for example, we observed Version 1 samples in late 2019 and in 2017, the year that we also saw Version 3.
Functionality of all samples are similar – the main purpose of spyware was to gather sensitive information. While the basic functionality was not very broad, and included geolocation, call logs, contact access and SMS access, the application could also gather a list of installed applications, as well as device information, such as model and OS version. Furthermore, the threat actor was able to download and execute various malicious payloads, thus, adapting the payload that would be suitable to the specific device environment, such as Android version and installed apps. This way the actor is able to avoid overloading the application with unnecessary features and at the same time gather information needed.

Spread
The main spreading vector used by the threat actors is distribution through application marketplaces. Apart from the com.zimice.browserturbo, which we have reported to Google, and com.physlane.opengl, reported by Dr. Web, we have observed tracks indicating that many malicious applications were deployed to Google Play in the past and have now been removed.
Some of the applications whose appearance in Google Play we can confirm.

Package name Google Play persistence date (at least)
com.zimice.browserturbo 2019-11-06
com.physlane.opengl 2019-07-10
com.unianin.adsskipper 2018-12-26
com.codedexon.prayerbook 2018-08-20
com.luxury.BeerAddress 2018-08-20
com.luxury.BiFinBall 2018-08-20
com.zonjob.browsercleaner 2018-08-20
com.linevialab.ffont 2018-08-20

Besides, we have identified multiple third-party marketplaces that, unlike Google Play, still host the malicious applications, such as https://apkcombo[.]com, https://apk[.]support/, https://apkpure[.]com, https://apkpourandroid[.]com and many others.

While analyzing the С2 server infrastructure, we quickly identified multiple domains that shared similarities with previous ones but were not linked to any known malware samples. This allowed us to uncover more pieces of the attackers’ infrastructure.

Domains and IP addresses
PhantomLance
mine.remaariegarcia[.]com
egg.stralisemariegar[.]com
api.anaehler[.]com
cloud.anofrio[.]com
video.viodger[.]com
term.ursulapaulet[.]com
inc.graceneufville[.]com
log.osloger[.]biz
file.log4jv[.]info
news.sqllitlever[.]info
us.jaxonsorensen[.]club
staff.kristianfiedler[.]club
bit.catalinabonami[.]com
hr.halettebiermann[.]com
cyn.ettebiermahalet[.]com

Android campaign 2014-2017
mtk.baimind[.]com
ming.chujong[.]com
mokkha.goongnam[.]com
ckoen.dmkatti[.]com
sadma.knrowz[.]com
itpk.mostmkru[.]com
aki.viperse[.]com
game2015[.]net
taiphanmemfacebookmoi[.]info
nhaccuatui.android.zyngacdn[.]com
quam.viperse[.]com
jang.goongnam[.]com

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